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Abstract 
Qualitative risk analysis is focused on applying methods to prevent accidents in diverse process 
plants. The numerical number resulting in the QRA tells nothing about the ability for systems’ 
recovery if an upset related to safety occurs in the process. Hence a resilience study is required to 
produce this additional information related to process safety. The resilience index is defined as the 
proportion of success in recovering the system compared to a number of safety-related upsets. The 
failure in recovering depends on type and quality of safety barriers, i.e. technology, but also on 
organizational principles. In this work, Monte Carlo simulation is carried out to estimate the 
resilience resulting in quantitative resilience estimations. These results provide means to compare 




Safety in the chemical industry is an important issue: it is directly related to saving lives and also 
to the global economy. Given the advances in process systems engineering, the complexity of 
current process operations and high demand of productivity become clear indicatives that risk 
should be reduced though it will never disappear. There are several techniques to estimate risk and 
its metrics to prevent a potentially high number of industry accidents (Prem et al., 2010). Other 
techniques have been also developed to include dynamic risk estimations (Yang and Sam Mannan, 
2010b; Yang and Sam Mannan, 2010a).  
 
Inclusion of layers of protection are typically suggested to decrease the estimated risk value until 
it achieves an acceptable value for the law or the particular level established in the particular 
company. Risk units are eventually a product of frequency and severity such as affected 
individuals/year. It does not include the estimation of how often the implemented protections avoid 
that incidents become accidents, i.e. an estimation of performing their task successfully. Resilience 
is an appropriate term to provide measurements of this probability. Indeed, the concept of 
resilience has been applied in several directions such as, for instance, protecting chemical areas 
against terrorism attacks (Reniers et al., 2014). Resilience in security is considered as the ability 
of systems to prevent or adapt to changing conditions in order to maintain (control over) a system 
property (Leveson et al., 2006). It gives a clear inclusion of both re-active and pro-active resilience 
aspects. 
 
In process systems engineering, an index for operational flexibility (also called static resiliency) 
was developed to describe the ability to operate a given process over a range of conditions while 
satisfying some performance specifications (Grossmann et al., 1983; Swaney and Grossmann, 
1985a; Swaney and Grossmann, 1985b). This flexibility index represents a systematic measure of 
the size of the feasible steady state operation region. Values between 0 and 1 for the flexibility 
index represent the fraction of the range of expected deviations which can be handled, while values 
of the index greater than 1 denote designs for which it is possible to exceed the expected deviations 
and yet have feasible operation; negative values are not valid. Eventually Morari and Grossmann 
agreed that flexibility and resilience are, in a way, similar concepts, see the historical evolution of 
pioneering work by these two workers in Grossmann et al. (2014). More recently, the concept of 
stability has been incorporated in flexibility analysis with the aim of detecting stable flexible 
regions for chemical processes (Jiang et al., 2014). The flexibility index in process systems 
engineering is then used to describe the potential of a given process to extent but remaining feasible 
over potential deviations in variables relating inputs, operating conditions or model parameters. 
The behavior of the involved variables can be visualized as uncertain and the flexibility index 
represents the largest deviation in the uncertain parameters that the process can tolerate in terms 
of the parameter deviations (Rogers and Ierapetritou). 
 
A concept of dynamic resilience has been also developed in control theory referring to the quality 
of the regulatory and the servo behavior which can be obtained for the plant by a feedback control 
(Morari, 1983). A procedure for analyzing the resilience to anticipate and predict how 
modifications in the design will change the resilience were then developed (Holt and Morari, 
1985). As a result of that research, a dimensional dynamic resilience index was proposed to 
evaluate resilience in neat exchanger networks (Saboo et al., 1985; Saboo et al., 1987).  Thus 
reliability can be seen as the probability that an item will survive without failure for a stated period 
of time under stated conditions of use (O'Connor, 1988). The definition implies that measurements 
or forecasts of reliability should be based on probability mathematics, and thus on statistics. 
Probability and statistics will then provide the basis for reliability theory though these disciplines 
cannot be applied with high credibility. Their improvements should be made early in the 
development cycle. 
 
Thus the concept of resilience has been seen from different points of view. Barker et al. (2013) 
have described resilience as the ability of a given components network to “bounce back” to the 
desired performance state after a disruption. They consider resilience as a function of four 
interacting paradigms: reliability, vulnerability, survivability, and recoverability. For state 
transitions over time in any system service function, the first period is governed by reliability 
where no disruptions are detected; next is a period of vulnerability where a mitigation approach 
allows survivability; and the last period, named recoverability, refers to the speed at which an 
entity or system recovers from a severe shock to achieve a desired state. In this way, vulnerability 
and recoverability become important drivers for resilience. Dinh et al. (2012) have identified six 
principles (flexibility, controllability, early detection, minimization of failure, limitation of effects, 
and administrative controls/procedures) and five main factors (design, detection potential, 
emergency response plan, human factor, and safety management) to contribute in the resilience of 
a process. They also proposed a resilience design index by combining indices for sub-factors based 
on predefined weight factors.  
 
In our opinion, it is clear that resilience is stochastic in nature. Design for reliability should include 
tolerance analysis due to the stochastic variability in production processes. An stochastic flexibility 
index has been already introduced to describe the probability that a particular design achieve 
feasible operation given process uncertainties incorporated through a joint probability distribution 
(Pistikopoulos and Mazzuchi, 1990; Straub and Grossmann, 1990; Straub and Grossmann, 1993). 
Safety systems should include resiliency in terms of avoiding failures (deliberately induced or not), 
pro-active, and losses, as well as responding appropriately after the fact, re-active. Any 
mathematical model used for reliability predictions must be subject to severe credibility limitations 
due to: a) the inappropriateness of mathematical models to the domain of reliability; b) the fact 
that the conditions do not necessarily remain constant over the period of prediction; c) sensitivity 
to variations of load and strength; d) human factors in management, manufacture, application and 
interpretation (O'Connor, 1988). Cai et al. (2015) have recently proposed a method to be used for 
fault propagation and control strategy analysis in petroleum refining system from the resilience 
engineering perspective. 
 
In this work, a safety resilience index is proposed to provide an estimation of the probability of 
keeping a process safe during unexpected hazardous situation. The following section provides the 
definition of this index while the subsequent section provides an estimation strategy. Then the 
index is estimated by applying the strategy in a case study to end up with the conclusions. 
 
A Safety Resilience Index (SRI) 
M. Morari and I.E. Grossmann agreed that the terms resilience and flexibility have essentially the 
same meaning (Grossmann and Morari, 1984; Grossmann et al., 2014). However, the term 
resilience has been preferred in control analysis whereas the term flexibility has been supported in 
overall process design. Thus a process is typically designed to operate at certain nominal 
conditions but, due to its flexibility, it could be operated for a certain range of uncertain conditions. 
Assuming a set of uncertain parameters u, e.g. inlet conditions; a set of control variables z to be 
adjusted during operation, e.g. flows; a set of state variables x defining the system, e.g. 
temperatures; and a set of design variables d related for instance to the structure and size of process 
units, then performance equations, e.g. conservation equations, and constraints such as physical 
constraints, define a model given by several equalities and inequalities constraints: 
 
𝒉(𝒖, 𝒛, 𝒙, 𝒅) = 𝟎 (1a) 
 
𝒈(𝒖, 𝒛, 𝒙, 𝒅) ≤ 𝟎 (1b) 
 
The full mathematical formulation to estimate the flexibility index has been given elsewhere 
(Swaney and Grossmann, 1985a; Swaney and Grossmann, 1985b; Biegler et al., 1997). This index 
becomes unity when the design has exactly the flexibility to satisfy the constraints on a given range 
of interest. A larger flexibility index implies that the design can go beyond this range whereas a 
lower value means that only a fraction of the range can be handled. A pictorial description of the 
flexibility analysis is given in Fig. 1 where two uncertain variables (𝑢1, 𝑢2) are considered to 
design the system for a nominal state NS, and the feasible region is defined by four inequality 
constraints, (𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑔3, 𝑔4). Assuming that the inner rectangle is based on possible uncertainties 
in the variables/parameters, then it indicates the design flexibility zone. In addition, the outer 





Figure 1: Geometrical representation of the flexibility index 
 
 
In process safety, the term resilience has been preferred over the flexibility concept. It is then 
understood that a given safe and resilient process should remain safe after unwanted events perturb 
it. Risk assessment provides means to make a system more resilient than before. Dinh (2011) has 
suggested that several factors contribute to safe resilience of chemical processes, where design, 
detection potential, emergency response, human and safety management factors are considered 
top. At the end, safety resilience should be increased with the inclusion of safety devices in a 
process for minimizing failures, early failure detection, minimizing effects, administrative controls 
and procedures. It is thus clearly understood that resilience will prevent highly undesirable 
transitions to catastrophic states through several means such as protections, appropriate design, 
and even well planned emergency procedures. It should also prevent any potential escalation, e.g. 
domino effect.   
 
While performing risk analysis such as QRA, a process is allocated in a certain risk level or 
category, see for instance Crowl and Louvar (2011), and each company may decide what is 
considered acceptable. For a given designed level of protection, the remaining question is related 
to its resilience. It is suggested here that unprotected processes should be considered to have nil 
resilience and denying the existence of absolute safety, then safety resilience index (SRI) definition 
should bound its values to the interval [ 0,1 ]. Any number in between would give the proportion 
of the number of incidents successfully prevented via safety devices or actions, i.e. the SRI 
represents the proportion of recovering from potential risk conditions. Considering that safety 
devices may become deteriorated with time, the SRI becomes dependent on time.  
 
Safety indicators often depend on operating conditions in such a way that severity of incidents is 
typically higher when operating conditions are also severe, e.g. high pressure or temperature. 
However, SRI becomes independent of severity in this definition. This fact does not demerit its 
relevance since it could detect the need of other time dependent actions such as maintenance of 
safety devices. In addition, the resilience concept is not only uncertain but highly stochastic by 
nature. In terms of process safety resilience, incidents are considered as such whenever they 
enforce a safety device to perform its work. It would be expected that the SRI of a given process 
will be improved by incorporating protective factors. For instance, an expected release may be 
estimated for a QRA and the estimated risk will be higher according to the amount released and 
its associated severity. QRA is related to safeguard, mitigation measures, training and standard 
operations procedures for upset events but the resilience index will focus only to ensuring that the 
process remains under control.  
 
Considering discrete events, the SRI can be considered as the proportion of incidents successfully 
avoided in a total amount of incidents where the use of any installed protective factor has been 
demanded. The estimation of the SRI is very difficult given its highly stochastic nature in the 
involved variables with complicated probability functions. However, the SRI ends up in a binomial 
distribution to indicate the probability of surviving an incident. This distribution should cover the 
whole operation possibilities for the system. Fig. 2 provides a graphical description of the SRI 












A Strategy to Estimate the SRI 
The SRI is a stochastic variable but its distribution function becomes too complex since it is a 
function of several stochastic variables. A copula methodology has been applied to formulate the 
joint prior distributions of the failure probabilities of a safety system under different accident 
conditions, and of several safety systems, formulated using event-trees (Meel and Seider, 2006; 
Yu et al., 2016)It gives an efficient alternative to traditional statistical methods. In this work, we 
proposed a Monte Carlo-based approach to generate a mapping of results in a binomial distribution 
function. Thus, a distribution function is associated to the failure of every safety protective item 
such as a valve. In fact, the resilience theory establishes the strategy to estimate system failures 
very often based on determining which system components are most influential on the performance 
of the system. Hence every safety protective measure can have an associated expression to 
calculate its failure probability. A safety protective system is meant to prevent that an incident 
becomes an accident and its probability of failure on demand depends on several factors such as 
maintenance. It is not the purpose of this work to review this material. Then we assume that these 
concepts are well known including the fact that there are means to estimate the probability of 
failure on demand. It is also clear that it is a function of time though we will assume that 
calculations are performed for a reduced time interval so that it can be seen as time independent. 
 
In this work, it is assumed that the main cause of producing hazardous incidents in a chemical 
process is due to pipe ruptures. However, the methodology can be extended to other initial events. 
Thus the methodology is described as follows: 
1. Identify all hazardous scenarios. 
2. Identify the cause-consequence scenarios. 
3. Apply the Monte Carlo approach. For each scenario: 
a) Solve all source models for dispersion, fire and explosion in for each stochastic 
variable. 
b) Identify if the scenario affects a surrounded populated sector. 
4. The SRI is estimated by the relation of scenarios where safety devices are demanded to 
operate and its operation prevents affecting populated sectors divided by the total number 
of simulated scenarios. 
 
Stochastic variables include initial event frequency, wind direction, wind speed, atmospheric 
stability and percent of pipe rupture. Their values in each scenario are randomly selected based on 
their respective probability distribution function. Safety protections could include alarms, 
automatic shutdown, interlocks, release systems, hydrocarbon detectors, fire protection systems 
and even safety procedures, see for instance Crowl and Louvar (2011) for details of description. 




The case given in the CCPS (AIChE/CCPS, 2000) a mixture is used here. Several scenarios with 
hazardous operations are simulated in Excel using the Risk Solver Platform (FrontlineSolvers, 
2016). The process consists of a typical distillation column operating at 4barg where the feed, 
containing 58% wt hexane and 42% heptane, is separated. It involves the column, a reflux drum 
and a thermosiphon reboiler, as well as the piping system. Diameter pipe for vapor service is 0.5m 
and for water service is 0.15m. Figure 3 gives a schematically description of the whole system. 
 
The plant is installed in a place such that 80m east there exist a warehouse and offices with 200 
people present 24 hours a day, uniformly distributed on a 1ha square land. This zone is in the 
average wind direction with respect to the distillation column (directions SE, E, and NE). The rest 
of the surrounded area is in fact unpopulated and flat land.  
 
The QRA approach suggests defining an initial list of incidents to consider all possible breaks or 
ruptures of items of equipment which would lead to a loss of containment. In this case, it is 
considered that pipes may break or rupture in several ways from a pinhole due to a full bore rupture 
at any position between the pipe ends. Possible reasons for ruptures includes corrosion or bad 
welding. At the end, the amount of material released depends on the rupture size and, in principle, 
it could be instantaneous or continuous. For simplicity, it was considered that all incidental releases 
contain pure hexane since it represents 2/3 part of the total inventory. Released material can be 
liquid, vapor, or a liquid-vapor mixture. Thus two scenarios are considered: 
1. Continuous releases due to partial pipe ruptures in liquid/vapor pipes. 
2. Instantaneous release where the column contents is released due to a rupture size larger 
than80% pipe diameters. The main cause is an overpressure in the process. 
 
It is assumed that there is always an initial event (either instantaneous or continuous) and any 
ignition source can produce fire or explosion. For instantaneous releases, the potential 
consequences are BLEVE, UVCE and flash fire (FF) while for continuous releases Jet Fires (JF) 
and FF are more likely. These consequences depend on having immediate or delayed ignition with 





Figure 3: Control systems and alarms in a distillation column 
Uncertain variables considered in this case are wind direction, wind speed, atmospheric stability, 
percent of rupture in pipes with liquid and percent of rupture in pipes with vapor. A probability 
distribution function is then assigned to each uncertain and highly stochastic variable. A uniform 
discrete probability function was applied for the following wind directions: 30°, 60°, 90°, 120°, 
150°, 180°, 210°, 240°, 270°, 300°, 330° and 360°. For wind speed, the Weibull probability 
distribution function have been adopted and 4 stability conditions (A, B, C and D) were assumed 
feasible with different assigned probability. Table 1 gives Weibull parameters used in this work 
for each selected direction. Historical data (OGP, 2010) have been used for releasing failure 
probabilities in the distillation column, Tables 2 and 3. Rupture frequency in pipes with liquids are 
indicated in Table 2 and for the vapor case are given in Table 3. A discrete probability distribution 
function was used to model the probability of rupture in both types of pipe. 
 
 




Weibull parameters for wind speed 
Shape factor Scaling factor 
30 2.6533 4.5024 
60 2.7053 5.2755 
90 2.6186 6.8634 
120 3.1254 8.6449 
150 2.9283 7.1950 
180 3.2550 6.6034 
210 2.7645 6.1306 
240 2.7597 6.5711 
270 2.7790 6.7461 
300 2.4984 7.3041 
330 2.1698 6.0327 
360 2.3463 4.5294 
 
 
Table 2: Rupture frequencies in 0.15m diameter pipes 
 






Table 3: Rupture frequencies in 0.5m diameter pipes 
 






The amount pf released material in the case of instantaneous release have been 28,000kg of hexane, 
assuming that gas is released in atomized form. In this way, drops are so small than they remain 
suspended to eventually be vaporized rather than accumulated in a pool. Appropriate models were 
used to estimate mass speed of liquid and vapor for continuous releases as suggested in Crowl and 
Louvar (2011). Released liquid partially vaporizes and some drops remain suspended in air to 
eventually vaporize. In addition, liquid forming a pond will eventually vaporize. Therefore, all 
liquid releases will eventually become vapor releases so that they could be dealt with as a single 
event of vapor releases. Since hexane is a dense gas, the dispersion model by Britter y McQuaid 
as described in Crowl and Louvar (2011) was used to estimate the downwind distance, x, where 
the lower flammability limit concentration for hexane is achieved. It includes a cloud size 
estimation. Since the released material is mainly flammable, no toxic effect was included in this 
analysis. 
 
Impact zones for BLEVE, UVCE, FF and JF were estimated using appropriate models in Crowl 
and Louvar (2011). An exposition time of 12sec and solar radiation to produce 50% fatality was 
used to estimate harms caused by BLEVEs. An overpressure of 3psi (causing minimal damage in 
buildings) was used to estimate damage due to UVCE. To calculate the area affected by the FF, 
the results of the dispersion model is used to define the area of fire where the LFL is reached from 
the releasing point. A simple step function is used where the likelihood of death is 1 for the area 
affected by the incident and 0 outside this area. Once affected areas for each incident are known, 
it was determined which of them had impact on the population close to the distillation column. It 
was defined as nefarious events those where the population that is located at 80 m from the 
distillation column became involved. Additionally there were cases where leaks can affect the 
control room within the installation where distillation column is located. The control room is 
allocated 20 m east from the column. 
 
A macro was generated in Visual Basic where the different random variables of the process for a 
given number of tests were calculated. In each test, random variables are sampled according to 
their probability distribution functions; then source, dispersion and impact models are solved and 
the number of successful protection is accounted. It is worth mentioning that more than one 
incident could end up in accident. For example, a continuous leakage may produce a JF and a FF 
with affected distances larger than 80m, then the incident counts 2 accidents for this test. At the 
end of the total of tests, the SRI is estimated as the ration of the number of protected incidents 
divided by the total number of incidents (simulated tests). 
 
It is suggested to incorporate alarms and control systems for pressure, temperature, flow and level 
to decrease the effects caused by instantaneous and continuous leakage of material by the rupture 
of pipes. Figure 3 shows typical alarms and control systems typically proposed for distillation 
column. A consequence analysis for failures in alarms and control systems has been used as 
follows: 
 
1. Control system in the pump to feed the column. In the event of a failure where this control 
is inactivate, the flow may increase and decrease the temperature in the column. Then the 
heating fluid flow in the reboiler will increase causing a greater amount of steam in the 
column exceeding the cooling capacity of the condenser; finally, an excess pressure is 
generated in the column and a release will be produced. 
2. Level control in the reflux drum: If this control fails and the tank is emptied, the steam 
quantity in the column increases and an overpressure is produced. In this case, venting is 
necessary to avoid a complete rupture of pipes and equipment. 
 
3. Control system for pressure in the dome: A measurement detects the overpressure 
generated by failures in other systems and, if the alarm also fails, an overpressure above 
the MAWP may produce a full rupture. 
4. Flow control of cooling fluid in the condenser: If the cooling unit is not sufficient then an 
overpressure may be produced and a venting valve should be activated to depressurize the 
column. 
5. Control system for temperature at bottom of the column: There is a valve regulating steam 
feeding the reboiler. When the temperature controller detects an excessive increase, the 
steam flow decreases to prevent overpressure in the column. When the associated alarm 
fails, both flow of steam and temperature may continue increasing and a full rupture might 
be produced. 
6. Dike for liquid containment: It is considered here that spray formed from continuous 
leakages due to pipes rupture or faults in seals for pumps and connections is not instantly 
vaporized but it condenses and forms a liquid pond that is contained in the dike. In this 
case, a vaporized fraction of 0.5 is considered.  
 
Safety valves for venting material security systems, when above described systems 1, 2 and 4, 
described fail, allows opening a relief valve to prevent overpressure. This situation causes an 
instantaneous release with a time variable leakage that depends on the time lasting the venting. 
The flow is 5 kg/s and the time that the valve remains open is considered as a random variable 
with a discrete uniform distribution with values of 0.1, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, during 1 to 
2 minutes. After this time, the pressure in the column should be slightly decreased and the safety 
valve closes again. If an ignition source exists during this event then UVCE and FF may be 
produced. On the other hand, when safety systems 3 and 5 fail 3 then a complete rupture of the 
unit may be produced, causing an instant leakage of all the material contained in the distilling 
column. BLEVE, UVCE and FF could be produced. Finally, if a source of ignition and a failure at 
the dike exist then the gaseous material that is not contained can cause a JF or a FF. 
 
A program in Visual Basic has been developed to represent failures in the six safety systems above 
mentioned. The type of safety systems in the process is also considered as random variable with a 
discrete probability distribution. Table 4 shows the PFD for safety systems used in the distillation 
column. To start, the SRI was calculated for the process without protection systems. A total of 
5000 tests were used in the estimation, as well as the types of adverse events that affect the 
neighborhood population and the control room. Then, six safety systems were considered to protect 
the process from events that could lead to partial and complete ruptures of pipes and process units. 
Finally, it considered that some of the six safety protections could fail and a redundant protection 
was incorporated. This second function of security could be a wall of containment, flame arrester, 
mitigation system, etc. PFD values used in this estimations are given in Table 4 whereas main 
results are given in Table 5. This table also indicates the results of the estimated SRI for all cases. 
 
 
Table 4: Failure rates for components in the process 
 
Safety System PFD /year 
Control system for  feed pump 0.2517 
Control system for reflux drum level 0.01 
Control system for column top 0.1647 
Control system in condenser 0.01 
Control system for bottoms temperature 0.01 
Dike 0.01 
Flame arrester, blast wall, fire proofing, mitigation 0.001 
  
 
Table 5: Safety resilience index for the system having different safety protections 
 
Number of safety 
systems 
SRI BLEVE UVCE FF (I) JF FF (C) 
0 0.64 0 2207 1367  10.1 686 
1 0.97 0  12 7 0 311 
2 1.00 0  0 0 0 0 
 
 
By including safety functions, it is observed that the number of incidents becoming accidents 
decreases in comparison to the unprotected case. However, a function could occasionally fail. In 
the situation where two safety systems were implemented in the distillation column, the SRI 
became highly resilient though it is clear that these are stochastic events. 
 
Conclusions 
A resilience index is proposed in this work to be included in process safety. It provides a 
quantitative measure of the ability of protecting a given process. The proposed resilience index 
yields an estimation of the probability of failure/success of being protected with the combined 
protections already installed in the process. In addition, a strategy to estimate this index assuming 
a binomial distribution has been proposed and applied in a case-study to highlight the advantages 
of this method. It clearly results in an aggregated characteristic to consider while proposing 
protecting layers for processes. The case study considered several scenarios and final numerical 
values for the resilience index was determined considering different cases of safety protections. In 
this way, the index was quantified for several scenarios to find a single numerical value that 
indicates how adequate the implemented safety functions is. 
 
Acknowledgements: One of the authors thank the MKOPSC-Texas A&M University for their 
support during his sabbatical, to TNM and CONACyT through project 254408. 
 
References 
AIChE/CCPS (2000). Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis, New York, 
New York: Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical 
Engineers. 
Barker, K., J. E. Ramirez-Marquez and C. M. Rocco (2013). "Resilience-based network 
component importance measures." Reliability Engineering & System Safety 117: 89-97. 
Biegler, L. T., I. E. Grossmann and A. W. Westerberg (1997). Systematic methods of chemical 
process design, Prentice Hall International Series. 
Cai, Z., J. Hu, L. Zhang and X. Ma (2015). "Hierarchical Fault Propagation and Control 
Modeling for the Resilience Analysis of Process System." Chemical Engineering 
Research and Design 103: 50-60. 
Crowl, D. A. and J. F. Louvar (2011). Chemical process safety : fundamentals with applications, 
3rd ed., Prentice-Hall international series. 
Dinh, L. T. T. (2011). Safety-oriented resilience evaluation in chemical processes. Chemical 
Engineering, Texas A&M University. Ph.D. 
Dinh, L. T. T., H. Pasman, X. Gao and M. S. Mannan (2012). "Resilience engineering of 
industrial processes: Principles and contributing factors." Journal of Loss Prevention in 
the Process Industries 25(2): 233-241. 
FrontlineSolvers. (2016). "http://www.solver.com/risk-solver-platform."   Retrieved August 30, 
2016. 
Grossmann, I. E., B. A. Calfa and P. Garcia-Herreros (2014). "Evolution of concepts and models 
for quantifying resiliency and flexibility of chemical processes." Computers & Chemical 
Engineering 70(0): 22-34. 
Grossmann, I. E., K. P. Halemane and R. E. Swaney (1983). "Optimization strategies for flexible 
chemical processes." Computers & Chemical Engineering 7(4): 439-462. 
Grossmann, I. E. and M. Morari (1984). Operability, resiliency and flexibility-process design 
objectives for a changing world. Proc. 2nd international conference on foundations 
computer aided process design, CACHE, Vol. 937. 
Holt, B. R. and M. Morari (1985). "Design of resilient processing plants—V: The effect of 
deadtime on dynamic resilience." Chemical Engineering Science 40(7): 1229-1237. 
Jiang, H., B. Chen, H. Wang, T. Qiu and J. Zhao (2014). "Novel Method for Considering Process 
Flexibility and Stability Simultaneously." Industrial & Engineering Chemistry Research 
53(38): 14765-14775. 
Leveson, N., N. Dulac, D. Zipkin, J. Cutcher-Gershenfeld, J. Caroll and B. Barrett (2006). 
Engineering resilience into safety-critical systems. Resil Eng Concepts Precepts. 
Hollnagel, E., D. Woods y N. Leveson, Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company. 
Meel, A. and W. D. Seider (2006). "Plant-specific dynamic failure assessment using Bayesian 
theory." Chemical Engineering Science 61(21): 7036-7056. 
Morari, M. (1983). "Design of resilient processing plants—III: A general framework for the 
assessment of dynamic resilience." Chemical Engineering Science 38(11): 1881-1891. 
O'Connor, P. D. T. (1988). Reliability engineering, Hemisphere Publishing Co., Springer-Verlag. 
OGP (2010). International Association of Oil and Gas Producers: Report No. 434-I: Process 
release frequencies. 
Pistikopoulos, E. N. and T. A. Mazzuchi (1990). "A novel flexibility analysis approach for 
processes with stochastic parameters." Computers & Chemical Engineering 14(9): 991-
1000. 
Prem, K. P., D. Ng, H. J. Pasman, M. Sawyer, Y. Guo and M. S. Mannan (2010). "Risk measures 
constituting a risk metrics which enables improved decision making: Value-at-Risk." 
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23(2): 211-219. 
Reniers, G. L. L., K. Sörensen, F. Khan and P. Amyotte (2014). "Resilience of chemical 
industrial areas through attenuation-based security." Reliability Engineering & System 
Safety 131(0): 94-101. 
Rogers, A. and M. Ierapetritou "Feasibility and flexibility analysis of black-box processes part 2: 
surrogate-based flexibility analysis." Chemical Engineering Science(0). 
Saboo, A. K., M. Morari and R. D. Colberg (1987). "Resilience analysis of heat exchanger 
networks—II. Stream splits and flowrate variations." Computers & Chemical 
Engineering 11(5): 457-468. 
Saboo, A. K., M. Morari and D. C. Woodcock (1985). "Design of resilient processing plants—
VIII. A resilience index for heat exchanger networks." Chemical Engineering Science 
40(8): 1553-1565. 
Straub, D. A. and I. E. Grossmann (1990). "Integrated stochastic metric of flexibility for systems 
with discrete state and continuous parameter uncertainties." Computers & Chemical 
Engineering 14(9): 967-985. 
Straub, D. A. and I. E. Grossmann (1993). "Design optimization of stochastic flexibility." 
Computers & Chemical Engineering 17(4): 339-354. 
Swaney, R. E. and I. E. Grossmann (1985a). "An index for operational flexibility in chemical 
process design. Part I: Formulation and theory." AIChE Journal 31(4): 621-630. 
Swaney, R. E. and I. E. Grossmann (1985b). "An index for operational flexibility in chemical 
process design. Part II: Computational algorithms." AIChE Journal 31(4): 631-641. 
Yang, X. and M. Sam Mannan (2010a). "The development and application of dynamic 
operational risk assessment in oil/gas and chemical process industry." Reliability 
Engineering & System Safety 95(7): 806-815. 
Yang, X. and M. Sam Mannan (2010b). "An uncertainty and sensitivity analysis of dynamic 
operational risk assessment model: A case study." Journal of Loss Prevention in the 
Process Industries 23(2): 300-307. 
Yu, H., F. Khan and V. Garaniya (2016). "A Probabilistic EquationMultivariate Method for Fault 
Diagnosis of Industrial Processes." To be published in Chemical Engineering Research 
and Design. 
 
 
